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Introduction
There are different reasons, why countries trade. The most important one, economists typically refer to, is that trade is a source of wealth. There is, however, a further reason, which usually is not mentioned in the economic literature, but is in the center of this analysis. Since the impact, global warming can have on regional societies, considerably varies across countries, trade is a kind of insurance against the risks of climate change and variability. For example, if in some region because of weather extremes food production is reduced, over the short-run the resulting losses might be substituted by imports. Over the long-run production could even shift to regions, which have the comparative advantage of being less vulnerable to climate change and variability. Seen in this way, trade is mean for adapting to the increasing risks of global warming (see Julia and Duchin, 2007) .
Moderating climate impacts is one side of the coin. The second one is that trade can spread the cost of climate change across regions. Here is a recent example. After six years of drought Australia's rice production almost collapsed in 2008. This was one of several factors contributing to a doubling of the world market price of rice, which led to panicked hoarding and violent protests in low income countries (see Bradsher, 2008) . In other words, output losses in a single region might cause higher world market prices, and the resulting terms-oftrade effects could pertain to real income losses in almost any country. This is a problem for the poorest in particular. Typically, these countries are heavily exposed to climate change, but they neither own the resources for coping with the associated risks, nor are they able to cover increasing expenses for imports through increasing their exports (see Cline, 2007) .
Both the direct impacts and the terms-of-trade-effects depend on the societies' vulnerability to climate change. In particular, the less sensitive production in export oriented sectors is to climate change, and the less dependent a country is on imports of vulnerable goods, the lower will be the term-of-trade effects. Consequently, investing into measures for reducing vulnerability seems in the interest of countries. On the one hand this could be mitigation, which refers to policy interventions such as the reduction of anthropogenic greenhouse gases emissions. On the other hand it could be adaptation, which refers to investment into processes, practices, or structures to moderate or offset potential damages of global climate 3 change, as well as to reduce the climate vulnerability of communities, regions, or countries (see Parry et al., 2007) .
Some adaptation is done autonomously by the market; some has the property of a regional public good and requires strategic investment. Many poor countries, however, lack the capability to adapt. This is not only because they are short of financial resources. Poor countries typically have weaker market institutions, and their governments routinely undersupply local public goods. Therefore, it must be expected that without financial and technical assistance climate change will pronounce the existing inequalities between the industrialized and the developing world (see Barrett, 2008) . For that reason three adaptation funds have been established at the 2001 COP6 meeting: (1) the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), which aims to support the 49 least developed countries, (2) the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), which provides financial support to all developing countries, and (3) the Adaptation Fund, which is based on Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (for details, see Dellink et al., 2009) .
And the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which has the goal to provide 100 billion US Dollar annually for mitigation and adaptation activities in developing countries, came closer to start operating at the recent COP17 meeting in Durban, South Africa.
Despite of that till today the contributions of industrialized countries are small compared to the financial resources, the developing countries need for adapting efficiently to global climate change. As Buob and Stephan (2011) discuss, one reason might be that as long as there is no international cooperation in the solution of the global climate problem, and as long as mitigation is voluntary, both the industrialized and the developing countries have low interest in funding adaptation. More precisely Buob and Stephan observe a paradox in the following sense: For economic reasons industrialized countries will financially assist adaptation in developing ones only, if the burden of mitigation is shifted from the developed to the developing countries, which, however, will harm the South's welfare.
As is often the case in game theory settings, Buob and Stephan (2011) Second, providing technical and financial assistance for adapting to the risk of climate change can be viewed as a kind of tied transfer from industrialized to developing countries.
Since the pioneering work of Bhagwati et al. (1983) it is recognized that terms-of-trade deterioration could lead to what literature calls a transfer paradox. That means, (1) a donor country might gain by giving aid to a recipient country, which then loses welfare through this transfer, and (2), changes in the international terms-of-trade caused by a transfer is the principal reason for such perverse results. This paper contributes to this literature, but is to our knowledge the first one, which in a systematic manner analyses the interaction between adaptation to climate change, international trade and terms-of-trade effects.
Generally it is argued that climate policy requires a long-term perspective. Undeniable this applies, if mitigation is the policy option under consideration, where, because of the inertia of the climate system, costs are borne early, but benefits accrue in the distant future. For the same reason it should be clear, however, that the climate will change, even if greenhouse gas emissions are drastically reduced immediately. In what follows, we take global climate change as given. One argument is that we adopt a mid-term perspective. A second one could be that an internationally coordinated mitigation policy exists, by which the development of the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration is exogenously determined. Based on this assumption Section 2 presents a simple analytical framework, which is designed to analyze the interaction between global climate change, adaptation and international trade. Section 3 discusses three different cases: (1) the pure trade effect of climate change, (2) optimal autonomous adaptation, and (3) funding adaptation in the presence of international trade. Section 4 concludes.
A North-South model of climate change, trade and adaptation
In the following we develop a static model of climate change, adaptation expenditures and international trade. Economic activities differ with respect to their sensitivity to climate 5 change. For example, agricultural production is more responsive to climate change and weather extremes than manufacturing cars or personal computers. Furthermore, the impact of climate change will be larger and more harmful in the developing countries of the South than in the industrialized ones in the North. This follows mainly from limited adaptive capacities, and since the fraction of economic activities, which are at risk of climate change disruption, is larger in poor than in rich countries (see Adger et al., 2003) . Taken together this motivates (1) to discriminate between sectors and commodities, which are vulnerable to climate change, and those which are not, and (2), to divide the world economy into at least two regions: North ( ) and South ( ). North corresponds to the OECD countries and represents a region of relatively high wealth, but relatively low exposure to climate change.
South is an acronym for the developing part of the world, which is poor, but highly vulnerable to climate change.
Let vulnerable be the nickname for the aggregate of goods and services, which are produced in climate sensitive sectors such as agriculture, animal husbandry, water supply or forestry.
Vulnerable and capital are traded on open international markets, and both are inputs into the regions' gross production. Thereby, gross production of region n is characterized by a linear homogenous function , where and are the inputs of vulnerable and capital, respectively.
The production of vulnerable is described by cost functions. Costs are expressed in units of gross output and are a strictly increasing function of the output and impacts of climate change, which in turn depend on two parameters: (1) the global climate, which is represented by atmospheric carbon concentration Q, and (2), the region's expenditure for regional adaptation. That means, the higher is the atmospheric carbon concentration Q and the lower is the region's investment into adaptation measures, the higher will the regional climate impact and hence the costs for producing a certain output of vulnerable goods and services. More precisely, we assume 2 Assumption 1:
2 For illustrative purposes let , where .
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As such costs of producing vulnerable are strictly increasing with atmospheric carbon con- (2006) in contrast to atmospheric carbon concentration precipitation as well as temperature change very much depends on the geographical location. Given the high level of abstraction, it seems reasonable therefore to represent global climate change through changes in the 7 atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide and capture differences in regional patterns through region specified costs functions.
Each region can invest in its own as well as the other region's adaptation. I.e.,
, where denotes own adaptation expenditure and is the investment of region into adaptation measures of region . Suppose further that the world markets both for vulnerable and capital are in equilibrium (2.1) ,
where denotes the exogenously given capital stock of region .
Let and denote the world market price of vulnerable and capital, respectively. Gross production can be consumed domestically and might be used to cover the costs of investing into adaptation as well as of producing vulnerable. Therefore, for any region the budget constraint is
where is domestic consumption. and are the net-deficits from trading vulnerable and capital, respectively.
Analysis
Let sectors behave as price takers. Then profit maximization leads to the following optimality conditions for an interior solution, which are both sufficient and necessary These conditions allow to define (1) exports as function of the world market price and the regional climate impact , (2) imports as function of price and capital inputs , and (3), capital inputs as function of the world capital market price r and vulnerable inputs , respectively.
Based on this and by taking the total differential of condition (2.1) we get after some manipulations (see Appendix, Proposition 1)
where is the slope of the world excess demand function of vulnerable. Since the slope is negative, climate change as well as regional adaptation affects the terms-of-trade: the higher (lower) is the impact of climate change on the regions' production of vulnerable, the less (more) will be exported, and hence, the world market price will rise (fall).
As condition (3.4) suggests (for a proof, see Appendix, Corollary 1), there will be no realloca- Consequently, since all sectors and regions behave as price takers, climate change will not lead to a reallocation of capital across regions.
An immediate consequence is that inputs of vulnerable into regional production are not directly affected by climate change, i.e.,
, .
There are, however, indirect effects. For, if the world market price of vulnerable rises due to global climate change, less will be put into regional production.
Trade as adaptation measure: the pure trade effect
In what follows, let us assume that there is no additional expenditure for adaptation, neither in the North nor in the South, i.e. , n = N,S. Then condition (3.4) turns into (3.4a) , whereas condition (3.2) implies (see Appendix, conditions (A5), (A6)) .
The first expression on the right represents the direct impact of climate change on exports of vulnerable, which is negative. The second one reflects trade effects and is positive (see (3.4a)). As such, the overall effect depends upon which of the two dominates. Moreover we have (3.5) . 10 Given conditions (A2), (A5) and (A6) (see Appendix) the first expression on the right hand is negative, while the second one is positive.
As mentioned above, countries in the North are less vulnerable to climate change that those in the South. Mendelsohn et al. (2006) predict that the poor countries of the South will suffer the largest part of the damages from climate change. Although adaptation, economic wealth, and technology may take influence on how market damages are distributed across countries, over the mid-term regional market impacts of global warming are essential zero in the US, Japan and Russia. India and many other low-income countries, however, might be confronted with significant losses. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that over the midterm the direct market impact of climate change on the production of vulnerable commodities is almost negligible in the North. I.e., let us assume for a moment 
Optimal autonomous adaptation
Next let us assume that both regions own the necessary resources to autonomously adapt to climate change. If adaptation is optimal in region n = N,S, then Kuhn-Tucker conditions imply (3.6) .
This indicates that in absence of budget constraints, in case of adaptation marginal adaptation expenditure equals marginal benefits, i.e., the marginal impact of adaptation on the costs of producing vulnerable. Since we explicitly discern between costs (expenditure) and benefits of adaptation, i.e., effects of adaptation on costs of producing vulnerable, we are able to define a total cost function . 
Conclusions
As our considerations indicate, economic losses, which climate change induces in vulnerable sectors, among which agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry are the most important ones, can be limited through shifting to imports rather than producing these goods at home.
Or to phrase it differently, trade can reduce the market damages of global climate change.
The problem of the poor countries is, however, that they may face difficulties to increase export earnings from other goods, which are necessary for paying for the additional imports.
As Cline (2007) notes this gives the problem a "let them eat cake" flavor. And it implies in 17 particular that if international trade is considered as mean of moderating the impacts of global warming, the corresponding terms-of-trade effects cannot be neglected.
One option of how to reduce the economic impact of climate change is to financially assist the developing countries in adapting to climate change. This is of particular importance, since many of the poor countries of the South lack the necessary resources for adapting optimally to the risk of climate change. As our analysis reveals providing financial assistance for adaptation can be Pareto-improving, if benefits of funding, i.e., damages, which are moderated through adaptation, are big enough, and if the recipient's expenditure for adaptation is low. If not, the paradoxical effect of recipient immiserization through tied transfers can occur.
Independent of that it must be mentioned that our analysis is based on the assumption that vulnerable products are traded on open and perfect world markets. Reality is far away from such a situation. In particular, this is not the case regarding international trade of agricultural products. For example, in 1973 the United States imposed an embargo on soybean exports in order to avoid inflationary effects of rising prices, and many nations are inclined to impose agricultural import barriers in the name of food self-sufficiency.
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